Vietnam investment regulations – Direct investment v.s. indirect investment
Under the Investment Law, direct investment means a form of investment whereby the investor invests its invested capital and participates in the management of the investment activity. On the other hand, indirect investment means a form of investment through the purchase of shares, share certificates, other valuable papers or a securities investment fund and through other intermediary financial institutions and whereby the investor does not participate directly in the management of the investment activity.
The confusing point here is what “participating in the management” of investment activity. If having purchased shares of a listed company in Vietnam, a foreign investor attends the shareholders meeting of such company and exercises its voting rights then arguably the investor has “participated in the management” of the company in Vietnam. A more relevant example is a foreign investor purchases a minority stake in a domestic joint stock company and nominates its personnel to hold position in the Board of Directors of such company. In such case, it is not clear if the investor could be deemed to have “participated in the management” of the company in Vietnam.
The consequences of being treated as a direct investment and an indirect investment may be material. If an investment is an indirect investment then the parties may not need to obtain an Investment Certificate and must settle the transaction in Vietnamese Dong through a VND capital contribution account. If an investment is a direct investment then the parties may need to obtain an Investment Certificate and could settle the transaction in foreign currency.
It would have been clearer if the Investment Law replaces the concept of “participating in the management” with “control”. In such case, an investor will be deemed to make a direct investment if it has “control” of the investment activity. In other cases, the investor will be deemed to make an indirect investment.
On 15 May 2026, the Government issued Resolution No. 66.17/2026/NQ-CP (the Resolution 66.17 or the new), slimming down the list of conditional business sectors currently set out in Appendix IV of Investment Law 2025 (the old).
Resolution 66.17 will take effect on 1 July 2026 and is set to expire on 28 February 2027, by which time the Government expects the National Assembly to formalise these adjustments through an amendment to Appendix IV. Although there would be a question about the effectiveness of the Resolution 66.17 over the Appendix 4 of Investment Law 2025 and how the investment authority will apply in practice, the investor may, in the meantime, treat the Resolution 66.17 as the working text for the next 9–10 months while following up on the law amendments.
Under Article 41 of the Law on Real Estate Business 2023 (Real Estate Business Law), a real estate project (Project) eligible for transfer may follow one of two sets of legal procedures, depending on how it was approved. While the difference may appear procedural at first glance, it has significant implications for when the transfer transaction is legally completed, and for what the parties can (or cannot) do if the transaction ultimately falls through. This post discusses the two procedures and the practical implications arising from the distinction between them.
Vietnam has temporarily raised several general economic concentration notification thresholds under Resolution No. 66.18 of the Government dated 18 May 2026 (Resolution 66/2026), a practical change for M&A transactions as fewer deals should be caught solely by Vietnamese assets, Vietnamese turnover or transaction value.
On 3 September 2025, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) released the Official Letter no. 13629 addressing questions related to difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations in the finance and investment sector. This correspondence has several notable issues that are summarized below. While some of the MOF’s guidance offers welcome flexibility and operational reassurance, others fall short of providing clear or comprehensive clarification, leaving important gaps unresolved and inconsistencies with other legislation unaddressed.
Delegation by the General Meeting of Shareholders endorsed in principle (Query no. 29)
Query/Issue raised:
Current regulations regarding delegation/authorisation (both could be translated to/from "uỷ quyền" in Vietnamese) by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) to the Board are unclear and conflicting. […]
A recurring issue in Vietnam corporate governance is whether a former member of the Board of Directors can be appointed as an “independent” Board member in the subsequent term, provided that all other statutory criteria are satisfied. This typically arises where companies want to retain a former board member while still complying with independence requirements under Article 155.2 of the Enterprises Law 2020 as amended in 2025 (Enterprises Law 2020).
Under Article 155.2(dd) of Enterprises Law 2020, an independent Board member must “not hold the position of member of the Board of the company within the last 05 years or longer unless he/she was designated in 02 consecutive terms.”
Vietnamese law currently lacks a formal definition of “latent defect” (khiếm khuyết ẩn) and a clear mechanism for allocating liability once such defects arise. This regulatory vacuum often leads to prolonged disputes between the Employer and the Contractor, particularly when the construction contracts do not include explicit risk allocation.
For the purpose of our discussion below, a “latent defect” is defined as a fault or flaw in construction works/item that is not discoverable through a reasonably thorough inspection at the time of handover.