49% foreign ownership limit and national treatment principle
Foreign investors are not allowed to hold more than 49% shares in a public company in Vietnam. Recently, the State Securities Commission has proposed to the Government to remove this restriction for certain sectors. In theory, even without the proposal, certain foreign investors may be entitled to acquire more than 49% shares in a Vietnamese public company pursuant to national treatment principle that Vietnam has undertaken in various investment treaty.
Vietnam undertakes to allow foreign investors to buy more than 49% of the shares in companies operating in certain sectors listed in the schedule of service commitments under the WTO Commitments (see Part C of Schedule 3). In addition, under certain bilateral treaties (e.g the Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection between Japan and Vietnam), Vietnam undertakes to accord a national treatment principle for investors from certain countries subject to limited exceptions. Under the national treatment principle, a foreign investor from a contracting country should be treated as no less favourable than a domestic investor. Accordingly, if a domestic investor is allowed to own more than 49% of the charter capital of a target company then a foreign investor from such contracting country should be allowed too.
Therefore, technically, the 49% foreign ownership limit applicable to public companies (listed or unlisted) under Vietnamese law may be inconsistent with these international agreements if (1) the public company operates in a service sector in which under the WTO Commitments, foreign investors are allowed to own more than 49% of the charter capital of a Vietnamese company, and (2) the foreign investors are from a country, which enjoys a national treatment principle under a bilateral treaty with Vietnam.
The Government officially issued Decree 102/2026/NĐ-CP (Decree 102/2026), which introduces critical amendments and supplements to Decree 75/2019/NĐ-CP (Decree 75/2019) regarding administrative penalties for violations in the competition sector. Effective from 20 May 2026, Decree 102/2026 provides clearer enforcement guidelines and adjusts penalty frameworks, particularly for economic concentrations.
Below is a summary of the key changes introduced by Decree 102 that will directly affect M&A transactions subject to merger control (economic concentration notification) requirements in Vietnam.
In March 2026, Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) released a draft decree (Draft Decree) implementing the Law on Personal Income Tax 2025 (PIT Law 2025) for public consultation. One proposal drew strong feedback from businesses and investors: a change to how individuals are taxed on the transfer of shares in non-public/unlisted joint-stock companies (JSCs). Following the consultation, the MOF now appears poised to step back from that change – welcome news for investors and companies engaged in M&A and private share transactions.
On 5 June 2026, the Government issued Decree 200 on private placement and trading of corporate bonds on domestic market and offering of corporate bonds on international market (Decree 200/2026). Decree 200/2026 will replace Decree 153/2020 on the same subject. In the past, Decree 153/2020 has been amended by Decree 65/2022 and Decree 8/2023. Decree 200/2026 introduces more conditions for private bond issuance.
5x debt/equity ratio
1.1. Decree 200/2026 reflects the 5x debt/equity requirement established under the 2025 amendment to the Enterprise Law. In particular, the debt of a bond issuer (including the value of the bonds to be issued) must not exceed 5 times of the equity of such issuer as recorded in the audited financial statements of the year preceding the issuance.
On 15 May 2026, the Government issued Resolution No. 66.17/2026/NQ-CP (the Resolution 66.17 or the new), slimming down the list of conditional business sectors currently set out in Appendix IV of Investment Law 2025 (the old).
Resolution 66.17 will take effect on 1 July 2026 and is set to expire on 28 February 2027, by which time the Government expects the National Assembly to formalise these adjustments through an amendment to Appendix IV. Although there would be a question about the effectiveness of the Resolution 66.17 over the Appendix 4 of Investment Law 2025 and how the investment authority will apply in practice, the investor may, in the meantime, treat the Resolution 66.17 as the working text for the next 9–10 months while following up on the law amendments.
Under Article 41 of the Law on Real Estate Business 2023 (Real Estate Business Law), a real estate project (Project) eligible for transfer may follow one of two sets of legal procedures, depending on how it was approved. While the difference may appear procedural at first glance, it has significant implications for when the transfer transaction is legally completed, and for what the parties can (or cannot) do if the transaction ultimately falls through. This post discusses the two procedures and the practical implications arising from the distinction between them.
Vietnam has temporarily raised several general economic concentration notification thresholds under Resolution No. 66.18 of the Government dated 18 May 2026 (Resolution 66/2026), a practical change for M&A transactions as fewer deals should be caught solely by Vietnamese assets, Vietnamese turnover or transaction value.
On 3 September 2025, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) released the Official Letter no. 13629 addressing questions related to difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations in the finance and investment sector. This correspondence has several notable issues that are summarized below. While some of the MOF’s guidance offers welcome flexibility and operational reassurance, others fall short of providing clear or comprehensive clarification, leaving important gaps unresolved and inconsistencies with other legislation unaddressed.
Delegation by the General Meeting of Shareholders endorsed in principle (Query no. 29)
Query/Issue raised:
Current regulations regarding delegation/authorisation (both could be translated to/from "uỷ quyền" in Vietnamese) by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) to the Board are unclear and conflicting. […]
A recurring issue in Vietnam corporate governance is whether a former member of the Board of Directors can be appointed as an “independent” Board member in the subsequent term, provided that all other statutory criteria are satisfied. This typically arises where companies want to retain a former board member while still complying with independence requirements under Article 155.2 of the Enterprises Law 2020 as amended in 2025 (Enterprises Law 2020).
Under Article 155.2(dd) of Enterprises Law 2020, an independent Board member must “not hold the position of member of the Board of the company within the last 05 years or longer unless he/she was designated in 02 consecutive terms.”
Vietnamese law currently lacks a formal definition of “latent defect” (khiếm khuyết ẩn) and a clear mechanism for allocating liability once such defects arise. This regulatory vacuum often leads to prolonged disputes between the Employer and the Contractor, particularly when the construction contracts do not include explicit risk allocation.
For the purpose of our discussion below, a “latent defect” is defined as a fault or flaw in construction works/item that is not discoverable through a reasonably thorough inspection at the time of handover.
When companies think about data protection, they usually focus on “visible” data like names, email addresses, or bank details. However, there is a hidden layer called metadata - essentially “data about data” - that often gets ignored.
Under Vietnam’s new personal data protection rules, overlooking metadata is a major risk. If metadata can be used to identify a specific person, it falls under the same strict rules as regular personal data.
What is Metadata? The “Digital Footprint”
Metadata is information that describes the context of a file or a message rather than the content itself. Even if you remove a person’s name from a file, the metadata can still point directly to them.
Vietnam is currently at a pivotal stage of infrastructure modernization. To meet the immense demand for capital, the State has moved to revitalize private sector participation, most notably through the “Build – Transfer” (BT) model.
In a typical BT arrangement, a private investor finances and constructs an infrastructure project, then transfers it to the State upon completion. In return, the State “pays” the investor with land funds, allowing them to develop a “reciprocal project” (dự án đối ứng) to recover their capital and generate profit. While this mechanism is essential to stimulate private sector participation, the recent new legal framework for BT projects may raise significant concern regarding the land access privileges granted to BT investors compared to their counterparts in the general real estate market. In particular,
The recently issued Case Law No. 81/2024/AL (CL 81) introduces a precedent that allows creditors to bypass the standard statute of limitations by re-characterizing an unpaid contractual debt as a property reclamation claim upon the mutual termination of the contract and an agreement on the payable amount. Below are a few of our observations regarding CL 81.
Summary of the Case
The dispute originated from a service contract between Company M (the Service Provider) and Company A (the Client). After the Service Provider performed its services, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the contract. Subsequently, the Client explicitly confirmed in writing the specific amount of the service fee it owed to the Service Provider and the late payment interest but ultimately failed to make the payment. When the Service Provider filed a lawsuit to recover the unpaid amount, the Client requested the court to dismiss the case, arguing that the 3-year statute of limitations for a contractual dispute had already expired.
For investors in Vietnam, "contributing capital" to a company can mean two very different things: becoming a legal owner (member/shareholder of a company) or simply being a business partner. A recent case law no. 78/2025/AL clarifies this distinction and indicates that several pieces of evidence may be considered to prove company member/shareholder status.
Case Summary
In this dispute, Mr. H, the plaintiff, provided significant funds to D Limited Liability Company, which was managed by his relatives. Although Mr. H received the profit distribution for over a decade and signed minutes acknowledging his contribution, Mr. H was never officially recorded as a member of the company in the enterprise registration certificates (ERC) or the company’s charter.
When partnering with government agencies (G2B), the risks often come from policy changes and the adoption of new legislation, causing obstacles, delays, and payment backlogs in PPP contracts (especially BT contracts). Following the establishment of Steering Committee 751 (Ban Chỉ Đạo 751) to resolve investment projects with pending legal issues, the Government has recently prepared a Resolution Draft (the Draft) to address approximately 160 transitional BT projects still facing legal obstacles (such projects, “Pending BT Project”).
Focusing specifically on Pending BT Projects where land-use rights serve as the State’s payment mechanism, the following analysis highlights critical issues arising from the proposed changes introduced by this Draft:
On 31 December 2025, the Government issued Decree 356/2025 guiding the implementation of the PDPL 2025, which took effect on 1 January 2026. Decree 356/2025 provides critical detailed guidance and, notably, resolves several ambiguities under the PDPL 2025 framework. This post highlights the key takeaways from this new regulation.
1. Expansion of "sensitive personal data": ID Cards and login credentials
As compared to the Draft PDPL Decree, Decree 356/2025 expands the scope of sensitive personal data to explicitly include:
On 11 December 2025, the National Assembly adopted new investment law (Investment Law 2025). On this blog, we discuss some key changes in the new Investment Law 2025.
Clarification of business investment conditions
The Investment Law 2025 refines the definition of business investment conditions (Điều kiện đầu tư kinh doanh) by introducing an explicit exclusion: these conditions no longer encompass technical standards and regulations issued by competent authorities concerning product or service quality. This addition narrows the scope of what constitutes a "conditional business line", distinguishing administrative market-entry conditions from mere technical product standards.
In a significant move to streamline the execution of the Land Law 2024, the National Assembly of Vietnam recently passed Resolution 254/2025 on specific policies and mechanism to resolve obstacles in implementation of the Land Law 2024. Effective from 1 January 2026, Resolution 254/2025 is intended to apply alongside the Land Law 2024 and prevails in case of conflict. In essence, Resolution 254/2025 could be considered as an amendment to the Land Law 2024.
In this post, we will summarize the key changes introduced under Resolution 254/2025.
1. Expanded Scope for Land Recovery
Resolution 254/2025 introduces three additional scenarios under which the State may recover land to promote socio-economic development. Specifically, it now includes:
On 18 December 2025, the Vietnamese government issued Decree 323/2025 on the establishment of Vietnam International Financial Center (VIFC). Decree 323/2025 takes effect immediately and provides guidance for Article 8 and 9 of Resolution 222/2025 of the National Assembly on VIFC. In this post, we discuss some interesting points of Decree 323/2025
1. Single or multiple units
The National Assembly intends that VIFC is one single unit. To confirm this intention, Decree 323/2025 provides that VIFC is a unified legal unit (thực thể pháp lý thống nhất in Vietnamese). However, Vietnamese law does not have definition of legal unit (thực thể pháp lý). In addition, this provision of Decree 323/2025 also seems to contradict with Resolution 222/2025 which defines VIFC as an area with defined geographical boundaries.
However, by locating that single unit into two separate location, putting it under management of multiples authorties, and giving each location a different set of priorities, it is doubtful on how the operation of VIFC can be unified. This is evidenced by:
The VIFC is oddly named as “Viet Nam International Financial Center in Ho Chi Minh City (VIFC-HCMC) and Viet Nam International Financial Center in Da Nang City (VIFC-DN)” which compries two individual names within one single entity name.
The Operating Authority and Supervisory Authority of VIFC have legal person status, which implied that these authorities’ legal responsibility is independent with VIFC’s legal responsibility.
The Law on Artificial Intelligence (AI Law), which was passed by the National Assembly on 10 December 2025, is arguably among the most anticipated pieces of legislation of Vietnam in 2025.
Unfortunately, similar to the Law on Digital Technology Industry, Vietnam’s AI Law still feels like a half-baked legislation, which makes it hard to clearly identifying the key players in the artificial intelligence (AI) value chain. This article would examine several key terminologies under the AI Law.