Internal Restructuring and Merger Filing in Vietnam – 2026 Update
The Competition Law 2018 does not exempt internal restructuring within the same group of companies (the Group) from merger filing requirements. In 2020, we argued that such transactions should, in principle, fall outside the merger filing regime (see more here). Over the past six years, however, the competition authority has not adopted that position. Enterprises therefore need a more practical means of managing the resulting risk.
From 1 July 2026, Resolution 66.18/2026/NQ-CP (Resolution 66.18) temporarily raises three of the four merger filing thresholds under Decree 35/2020. The total assets threshold in the Vietnamese market is raised from VND 3,000 billion to VND 6,000 billion for the financial year immediately preceding the year of the proposed transaction. The threshold for total sales turnover or purchase turnover in the Vietnamese market is increased from VND 3,000 billion to VND 6,000 billion in the immediately preceding financial year. The transaction value of the economic concentration is increased from VND 1,000 billion to VND 2,000 billion. These revised thresholds apply until 28 February 2027.
Although the higher thresholds should reduce the number of notifiable transactions, they do not appear to address internal restructurings among companies within the same Group. Under Article 13.1(a) of Decree 35/2020, the asset threshold is assessed by reference to the group of affiliated enterprises of which the party to the economic concentration is a member. As a result, a transfer of equity between two subsidiaries with limited assets may still trigger a filing obligation solely because the aggregate assets of the Group include the assets of the parent meet the threshold.
Why an internal transaction is still notifiable
Assume that a parent company (ParentCo) controls Subsidiary B and Subsidiary C. Subsidiary B sells its entire equity interest in a target companny (TargetCo) to Subsidiary C. The transaction may be treated as notifiable on the following grounds:
it constitutes an “acquisition of an enterprise” (mua lại doanh nghiệp) under Article 29.4 of the Competition Law 2018 — that is, a direct or indirect acquisition of another enterprise’s equity sufficient to obtain control or governance over that enterprise;
it meets a filing threshold if the Group’s total assets in Vietnam amount to VND 6,000 billion or more; and
Article 33.1 of the Competition Law 2018 requires a notification whenever a threshold is met, and there is no exception. The law also does not allow an enterprise to assess the competition-restraining impact for itself and, on that basis, decide whether to file.
The arguments we advanced in 2020 remain available. On those arguments, the transaction falls outside the scope of Article 1 of the Competition Law 2018, because (i) it has no competition-restraining impact, since it does not change the parent’s common control over the subsidiaries which are parties to the transaction, and (ii) companies in the Group are not “different” enterprises (doanh nghiệp khác) of one another, because they are under the control of the same parent. Those arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade the authority. At a seminar in January 2021, a representative of the competition authority confirmed that internal restructurings remain subject to the notification requirement (see more here). In practice, the Vietnam Competition Commission (VCC) has published a number of clearances for equity transfers between subsidiaries, for example transactions related to Vinhomes.
A possible structure: capital contribution and buy-back
In our earlier note on potential structures for overcoming a merger filing threshold, we discussed transactions which are not structured as a sale (see more here). Applying that idea to an intra-group transfer of 100% of the equity, the Group may consider a two-step structure:
Step 1 – Subsidiary C contributes to TargetCo an amount corresponding to the proposed transfer price, in return for new equity issued by TargetCo. The resulting shareholding must remain below the control threshold under Article 2 of Decree 35/2020 i.e., more than 50% of charter capital or more than 50% of total voting shares. Apart from the ownership percentage, Subsidiary C must not hold rights such as the right to appoint a majority of the management personnel, or the right to decide amendments to the charter.
Step 2 – TargetCo uses that amount to buy back the equity of Subsidiary B, relying on Article 51.1 or Article 132.1 of the Enterprise Law 2020. TargetCo then registers a reduction of charter capital in order to cancel that equity (Article 68.3(b) or Article 134 of the Enterprise Law 2020). Subsidiary C becomes the sole owner of TargetCo.
On this analysis, Subsidiary C does not acquire equity sufficient to control TargetCo. The equity of Subsidiary B is cancelled, and it does not pass to Subsidiary C. The arrangement therefore arguably falls outside the definition of an acquisition of an enterprise under Article 29.4.
Risks of the structure
The structure may mitigate filing risk, but it does not eliminate it:
Article 29.4 of the Competition Law 2018 extends to indirect acquisitions. Given that Subsidiary C ultimately holds 100% of TargetCo, the VCC may treat the two steps as a single economic concentration.
The grounds for a buy-back are narrow. In the case of a joint stock company, Article 132.1 of the Enterprise Law 2020 applies only where a shareholder has voted against a resolution on corporate reorganization or on a change to shareholders’ rights and obligations. A buy-back decided by the company (Article 133 of the Enterprise Law 2020) is limited to 30% of the total number of ordinary shares already sold, within 12 months. A limited liability company is more flexible, because the charter may add further cases in which a buy-back is permitted. If TargetCo is a single-member limited liability company, Step 1 will require a conversion of corporate form.
Following the buy-back, TargetCo must remain able to discharge its debts and other property obligations in full.
The structure requires several approvals of related-party transactions and several registrations of changes, in addition to tax consequences. The overall time may be longer than the preliminary appraisal of a notification dossier.
The structure is not appropriate for a transaction with a party outside the Group. Where control in substance passes to a third party, there is a substantially higher risk that the authorities will characterize the steps as an attempt to conceal a sale.
There remains a risk of a penalty for failure to notify. From 20 May 2026, the sanction has changed from a fine calculated by reference to turnover to fixed fines under Decree 102/2026/ND-CP. The fine may not be significant compared with the value of the transaction, but an investigation may delay the restructuring substantially.
This post is written by Nguyen Thuc Anh and Le Hieu Ngan.