New amendments to equitisation rules
In an attempt to accelerate the equitisation of State-owned enterprises (SOE), in November 2013, the Government issued certain changes to the existing equitisation rules under Decree 59/2011. The amendments took effect on 15 January 2014 covering the following:
- The time limit during which the enterprise valuation remains effective is prolonged from 12 months to 18 months. This amendment reflects that many equitsation process take longer time than expected.
- The requirement to have the State Audit to review the enterprise valuation is limited to the holding company of State Economic Group only. Previously, the valuation of SOEs with State capital of VND 500 billion or more operating in various sectors is subject to review by the State Audit.
- An equitised SOE may delay the settlement or valuation of certain outstanding receivable or payable amounts before the registration of the equitised joint stock company (JSC) if the equitised SOE is large and has many receivable or payable amounts.
- The new amendments only require an equitised SOE to reevaluate and take into account the land use rights which are “allocated” to it for real estate development or which are decided by the Prime Minister. All other land use rights will be converted into leased land use rights. The payment made for allocated land will constitute pre-payment of land rental. Under Decree 59/2011, an equitised SOE has the option to select between to have its land use rights allocated or leased to it. This provision is said to be one of the obstacles in valuating an equitised SOE.
- If an equitised SOE contributed land use rights to the charter capital of another company, then the capital contribution will either be transferred to a different SOE (if permitted by other shareholders or members) or be inherited by the equitised JSC.
- The management of an equitised SOE will be subject to penalty if they miss the schedule of the equitisation process.
The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) officially issued Circular 38/2026/TT-NHNN dated 31 July 2026 on foreign exchange management for foreign investment activities in Vietnam (Circular 38/2026). Effective from 18 August 2026, Circular 38/2026 replaces Circular 06/2019/TT-NHNN (Circular 06/2019) as amended by Circular 03/2025/TT-NHNN (Circular 03/2025), which has governed the direct investment capital account (DICA) regime since 2019. Circular 38/2026 also terminates Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of Circular 03/2025 on opening and use of VND-denominated accounts for conducting foreign indirect investment in Vietnam and amends Circular 16/2014/TT-NHNN on the use of foreign currency and Vietnamese dong accounts of residents and non-residents.
A typical share sale agreement (SPA) takes effect on signing. Closing, when the buyer and the seller exchange money and title to the shares, usually comes later, once conditions have been met. One might expect tax on the sale to be imposed when the shares are sold, that is, at closing. But where a foreign enterprise with no permanent establishment (Foreign Seller) in Vietnam sells shares in an unlisted Vietnamese company to a resident buyer, Article 5.2(a) of Circular 20/2026 provides that revenue is taxed when the initial capital-transfer contract takes effect. On the face of that Article, the SPA can be that contract, and signing can be when it takes effect. The fact that closing has not yet occurred might not, by itself, defer the tax. Until Circular 20/2026, that was not so.
Similar to the Enterprise Law 2005 and the Enterprise Law 2014, the Enterprise Law 2020 is silent on whether founding shareholders may hold voting preference shares newly issued after the issuance date of the enterprise registration certificate (ERC), and only provides at Article 116.1 that the voting preference of founding shareholders is effective for three years from that date. This blog will examine different views on this issue.
On the one hand, one may support the view that founding shareholders are entitled to hold voting preference shares issued after ERC issuance date because:
Based on Resolution No. 206/2025/QH15 of the National Assembly on special mechanisms to address difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations, the Government has issued several Resolutions on administrative procedure reduction (such as Resolution 66.16/2026/NQ-CP, Resolution 66.18/2026/NQ-CP, etc.). Most of these provisions remain effective until 28 February 2027. If new provisions covering the same subject matter are promulgated to replace them during this period, the relevant provisions of these Resolutions will automatically cease to be effective.
On 16 March 2026, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued the draft decree on administrative sanctions in the fields of cybersecurity and personal data protection (the Draft Decree) for public consultation. It is the first step to put concrete penalties behind the PDPL 2025, which took effect on 1 January 2026 but left the enforcement details to the Government. The Draft covers a wide range of sectors, such as cybersecurity, personal data, AI, telecommunications, and digital signatures. This post focuses on the personal data provisions (Articles 57 to 69 of the Draft Decree), which raise potential concerns for businesses.
On 5 June 2026, the Government issued Decree 200 on private placement and trading of corporate bonds on domestic market and offering of corporate bonds on international market (Decree 200/2026). Decree 200/2026 will replace Decree 153/2020 (as amended) on the same subject. We have discussed certain contents of Decree 200/2026 in New Decree on private bonds (Part 1) — Vietnam Business Law.
The Government officially issued Decree 102/2026/NĐ-CP (Decree 102/2026), which introduces critical amendments and supplements to Decree 75/2019/NĐ-CP (Decree 75/2019) regarding administrative penalties for violations in the competition sector. Effective from 20 May 2026, Decree 102/2026 provides clearer enforcement guidelines and adjusts penalty frameworks, particularly for economic concentrations.
Below is a summary of the key changes introduced by Decree 102 that will directly affect M&A transactions subject to merger control (economic concentration notification) requirements in Vietnam.
In March 2026, Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) released a draft decree (Draft Decree) implementing the Law on Personal Income Tax 2025 (PIT Law 2025) for public consultation. One proposal drew strong feedback from businesses and investors: a change to how individuals are taxed on the transfer of shares in non-public/unlisted joint-stock companies (JSCs). Following the consultation, the MOF now appears poised to step back from that change – welcome news for investors and companies engaged in M&A and private share transactions.
On 5 June 2026, the Government issued Decree 200 on private placement and trading of corporate bonds on domestic market and offering of corporate bonds on international market (Decree 200/2026). Decree 200/2026 will replace Decree 153/2020 on the same subject. In the past, Decree 153/2020 has been amended by Decree 65/2022 and Decree 8/2023. Decree 200/2026 introduces more conditions for private bond issuance.
5x debt/equity ratio
1.1. Decree 200/2026 reflects the 5x debt/equity requirement established under the 2025 amendment to the Enterprise Law. In particular, the debt of a bond issuer (including the value of the bonds to be issued) must not exceed 5 times of the equity of such issuer as recorded in the audited financial statements of the year preceding the issuance.
On 15 May 2026, the Government issued Resolution No. 66.17/2026/NQ-CP (the Resolution 66.17 or the new), slimming down the list of conditional business sectors currently set out in Appendix IV of Investment Law 2025 (the old).
Resolution 66.17 will take effect on 1 July 2026 and is set to expire on 28 February 2027, by which time the Government expects the National Assembly to formalise these adjustments through an amendment to Appendix IV. Although there would be a question about the effectiveness of the Resolution 66.17 over the Appendix 4 of Investment Law 2025 and how the investment authority will apply in practice, the investor may, in the meantime, treat the Resolution 66.17 as the working text for the next 9–10 months while following up on the law amendments.
Under Article 41 of the Law on Real Estate Business 2023 (Real Estate Business Law), a real estate project (Project) eligible for transfer may follow one of two sets of legal procedures, depending on how it was approved. While the difference may appear procedural at first glance, it has significant implications for when the transfer transaction is legally completed, and for what the parties can (or cannot) do if the transaction ultimately falls through. This post discusses the two procedures and the practical implications arising from the distinction between them.
Vietnam has temporarily raised several general economic concentration notification thresholds under Resolution No. 66.18 of the Government dated 18 May 2026 (Resolution 66/2026), a practical change for M&A transactions as fewer deals should be caught solely by Vietnamese assets, Vietnamese turnover or transaction value.
On 3 September 2025, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) released the Official Letter no. 13629 addressing questions related to difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations in the finance and investment sector. This correspondence has several notable issues that are summarized below. While some of the MOF’s guidance offers welcome flexibility and operational reassurance, others fall short of providing clear or comprehensive clarification, leaving important gaps unresolved and inconsistencies with other legislation unaddressed.
Delegation by the General Meeting of Shareholders endorsed in principle (Query no. 29)
Query/Issue raised:
Current regulations regarding delegation/authorisation (both could be translated to/from "uỷ quyền" in Vietnamese) by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) to the Board are unclear and conflicting. […]
A recurring issue in Vietnam corporate governance is whether a former member of the Board of Directors can be appointed as an “independent” Board member in the subsequent term, provided that all other statutory criteria are satisfied. This typically arises where companies want to retain a former board member while still complying with independence requirements under Article 155.2 of the Enterprises Law 2020 as amended in 2025 (Enterprises Law 2020).
Under Article 155.2(dd) of Enterprises Law 2020, an independent Board member must “not hold the position of member of the Board of the company within the last 05 years or longer unless he/she was designated in 02 consecutive terms.”
Vietnamese law currently lacks a formal definition of “latent defect” (khiếm khuyết ẩn) and a clear mechanism for allocating liability once such defects arise. This regulatory vacuum often leads to prolonged disputes between the Employer and the Contractor, particularly when the construction contracts do not include explicit risk allocation.
For the purpose of our discussion below, a “latent defect” is defined as a fault or flaw in construction works/item that is not discoverable through a reasonably thorough inspection at the time of handover.
When companies think about data protection, they usually focus on “visible” data like names, email addresses, or bank details. However, there is a hidden layer called metadata - essentially “data about data” - that often gets ignored.
Under Vietnam’s new personal data protection rules, overlooking metadata is a major risk. If metadata can be used to identify a specific person, it falls under the same strict rules as regular personal data.
What is Metadata? The “Digital Footprint”
Metadata is information that describes the context of a file or a message rather than the content itself. Even if you remove a person’s name from a file, the metadata can still point directly to them.
Vietnam is currently at a pivotal stage of infrastructure modernization. To meet the immense demand for capital, the State has moved to revitalize private sector participation, most notably through the “Build – Transfer” (BT) model.
In a typical BT arrangement, a private investor finances and constructs an infrastructure project, then transfers it to the State upon completion. In return, the State “pays” the investor with land funds, allowing them to develop a “reciprocal project” (dự án đối ứng) to recover their capital and generate profit. While this mechanism is essential to stimulate private sector participation, the recent new legal framework for BT projects may raise significant concern regarding the land access privileges granted to BT investors compared to their counterparts in the general real estate market. In particular,
The recently issued Case Law No. 81/2024/AL (CL 81) introduces a precedent that allows creditors to bypass the standard statute of limitations by re-characterizing an unpaid contractual debt as a property reclamation claim upon the mutual termination of the contract and an agreement on the payable amount. Below are a few of our observations regarding CL 81.
Summary of the Case
The dispute originated from a service contract between Company M (the Service Provider) and Company A (the Client). After the Service Provider performed its services, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the contract. Subsequently, the Client explicitly confirmed in writing the specific amount of the service fee it owed to the Service Provider and the late payment interest but ultimately failed to make the payment. When the Service Provider filed a lawsuit to recover the unpaid amount, the Client requested the court to dismiss the case, arguing that the 3-year statute of limitations for a contractual dispute had already expired.
For investors in Vietnam, "contributing capital" to a company can mean two very different things: becoming a legal owner (member/shareholder of a company) or simply being a business partner. A recent case law no. 78/2025/AL clarifies this distinction and indicates that several pieces of evidence may be considered to prove company member/shareholder status.
Case Summary
In this dispute, Mr. H, the plaintiff, provided significant funds to D Limited Liability Company, which was managed by his relatives. Although Mr. H received the profit distribution for over a decade and signed minutes acknowledging his contribution, Mr. H was never officially recorded as a member of the company in the enterprise registration certificates (ERC) or the company’s charter.