“Shadow” Directors
In other jurisdictions, a shadow director is commonly understood as a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. The concept of shadow director is to capture those who are not formally directors of a company but actually control such company through actions of the directors of such company.
Vietnamese law does not contain the concept of shadow directors. Instead, Vietnamese law adopts a “form over substance” approach whereby a person is regarded as a Director of a public Joint Stock Company (Public JSC) if:
- such person satisfies the conditions of being a Board Member and a General Director; and
- such person is appointed by the Shareholders Meeting as a Board Member or by the Board as the General Director of the Public JSC.
In Vietnam, it is not an uncommon practice for controlling or influential shareholders of a Public JSC to interfere the operation of the Public JSC through the Board of such Public JSC. For example,
- the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), a large holding State-owned company with controlling stakes in many companies in Vietnam, expressly requires its representatives who sit on the Board of a joint stock company to vote according to instructions given by the SCIC on various matters; and
- Certain Large Public JSCs such as Asia Commercial
Bank and FPT
Corporation
in Vietnam have also created “Founding Committee” (Hội đồng Sáng lập) comprising of former Board Members or influential shareholders of the relevant Public JSC. The Founding Committees of these Public JSCs are entitled to attend meetings of the Board, make recommendation and advice to the Board.
If the Boards of these Public JSCs regularly act in accordance with instructions of SCIC or the Founding Committee then SCIC or members of the Founding Committee may be regarded as shadow directors of these Public JSCs under the law of other jurisdictions. However, the lack of provisions regulating shadow directors under Vietnamese law would make it more difficult for imposing statutory duties of a Director to controlling or influential shareholders of Public JSCs to interfere the operation of a Public JSC through the Board of such Public JSC.
That being said, in theory, under certain provisions of Vietnamese law, a shadow director of a Public JSC may still potentially be subject to liabilities of the Directors of such Public JSC:
- Under Article 8 of the Enterprise Law, a Public JSC is entitled to operate and run its business in its own discretion. In addition, Article 11.7 of the Enterprise Law prohibits any action, which prevents shareholders of a joint stock company from exercising their rights in accordance with the Enterprise Law and the charter of the company. If a controlling or influential shareholder interferes the operation of a Public JSC through the Board of such Public JSC then such controlling or influential shareholder may be arguably regarded as preventing other shareholders from exercising their shareholders’ right or interfering the right of the Public JSC to run its business in its own discretion.
- Article 80.5 of the Enterprise Law provides that a shareholder holding ordinary shares in a joint stock company must bear “personal liability” where such shareholder performs one of the following acts in any form in the name of the company: (1) to breach the law; (2) to conduct business and other transactions for the personal benefit of itself or other organisations or individuals; or (3) to pay premature debts where the company is likely to be in financial danger.
- Article 147 of the Enterprise Law prohibits a parent company from interfering with the operation of its subsidiaries other than by exercising the right of a shareholder in its subsidiaries. If a manager of a parent company interfering with the operation of its subsidiaries then the manager may be jointly liable for the damages caused to the subsidiaries.
The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) officially issued Circular 38/2026/TT-NHNN dated 31 July 2026 on foreign exchange management for foreign investment activities in Vietnam (Circular 38/2026). Effective from 18 August 2026, Circular 38/2026 replaces Circular 06/2019/TT-NHNN (Circular 06/2019) as amended by Circular 03/2025/TT-NHNN (Circular 03/2025), which has governed the direct investment capital account (DICA) regime since 2019. Circular 38/2026 also terminates Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of Circular 03/2025 on opening and use of VND-denominated accounts for conducting foreign indirect investment in Vietnam and amends Circular 16/2014/TT-NHNN on the use of foreign currency and Vietnamese dong accounts of residents and non-residents.
A typical share sale agreement (SPA) takes effect on signing. Closing, when the buyer and the seller exchange money and title to the shares, usually comes later, once conditions have been met. One might expect tax on the sale to be imposed when the shares are sold, that is, at closing. But where a foreign enterprise with no permanent establishment (Foreign Seller) in Vietnam sells shares in an unlisted Vietnamese company to a resident buyer, Article 5.2(a) of Circular 20/2026 provides that revenue is taxed when the initial capital-transfer contract takes effect. On the face of that Article, the SPA can be that contract, and signing can be when it takes effect. The fact that closing has not yet occurred might not, by itself, defer the tax. Until Circular 20/2026, that was not so.
Similar to the Enterprise Law 2005 and the Enterprise Law 2014, the Enterprise Law 2020 is silent on whether founding shareholders may hold voting preference shares newly issued after the issuance date of the enterprise registration certificate (ERC), and only provides at Article 116.1 that the voting preference of founding shareholders is effective for three years from that date. This blog will examine different views on this issue.
On the one hand, one may support the view that founding shareholders are entitled to hold voting preference shares issued after ERC issuance date because:
Based on Resolution No. 206/2025/QH15 of the National Assembly on special mechanisms to address difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations, the Government has issued several Resolutions on administrative procedure reduction (such as Resolution 66.16/2026/NQ-CP, Resolution 66.18/2026/NQ-CP, etc.). Most of these provisions remain effective until 28 February 2027. If new provisions covering the same subject matter are promulgated to replace them during this period, the relevant provisions of these Resolutions will automatically cease to be effective.
On 16 March 2026, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued the draft decree on administrative sanctions in the fields of cybersecurity and personal data protection (the Draft Decree) for public consultation. It is the first step to put concrete penalties behind the PDPL 2025, which took effect on 1 January 2026 but left the enforcement details to the Government. The Draft covers a wide range of sectors, such as cybersecurity, personal data, AI, telecommunications, and digital signatures. This post focuses on the personal data provisions (Articles 57 to 69 of the Draft Decree), which raise potential concerns for businesses.
On 5 June 2026, the Government issued Decree 200 on private placement and trading of corporate bonds on domestic market and offering of corporate bonds on international market (Decree 200/2026). Decree 200/2026 will replace Decree 153/2020 (as amended) on the same subject. We have discussed certain contents of Decree 200/2026 in New Decree on private bonds (Part 1) — Vietnam Business Law.
The Government officially issued Decree 102/2026/NĐ-CP (Decree 102/2026), which introduces critical amendments and supplements to Decree 75/2019/NĐ-CP (Decree 75/2019) regarding administrative penalties for violations in the competition sector. Effective from 20 May 2026, Decree 102/2026 provides clearer enforcement guidelines and adjusts penalty frameworks, particularly for economic concentrations.
Below is a summary of the key changes introduced by Decree 102 that will directly affect M&A transactions subject to merger control (economic concentration notification) requirements in Vietnam.
In March 2026, Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) released a draft decree (Draft Decree) implementing the Law on Personal Income Tax 2025 (PIT Law 2025) for public consultation. One proposal drew strong feedback from businesses and investors: a change to how individuals are taxed on the transfer of shares in non-public/unlisted joint-stock companies (JSCs). Following the consultation, the MOF now appears poised to step back from that change – welcome news for investors and companies engaged in M&A and private share transactions.
On 5 June 2026, the Government issued Decree 200 on private placement and trading of corporate bonds on domestic market and offering of corporate bonds on international market (Decree 200/2026). Decree 200/2026 will replace Decree 153/2020 on the same subject. In the past, Decree 153/2020 has been amended by Decree 65/2022 and Decree 8/2023. Decree 200/2026 introduces more conditions for private bond issuance.
5x debt/equity ratio
1.1. Decree 200/2026 reflects the 5x debt/equity requirement established under the 2025 amendment to the Enterprise Law. In particular, the debt of a bond issuer (including the value of the bonds to be issued) must not exceed 5 times of the equity of such issuer as recorded in the audited financial statements of the year preceding the issuance.
On 15 May 2026, the Government issued Resolution No. 66.17/2026/NQ-CP (the Resolution 66.17 or the new), slimming down the list of conditional business sectors currently set out in Appendix IV of Investment Law 2025 (the old).
Resolution 66.17 will take effect on 1 July 2026 and is set to expire on 28 February 2027, by which time the Government expects the National Assembly to formalise these adjustments through an amendment to Appendix IV. Although there would be a question about the effectiveness of the Resolution 66.17 over the Appendix 4 of Investment Law 2025 and how the investment authority will apply in practice, the investor may, in the meantime, treat the Resolution 66.17 as the working text for the next 9–10 months while following up on the law amendments.
Under Article 41 of the Law on Real Estate Business 2023 (Real Estate Business Law), a real estate project (Project) eligible for transfer may follow one of two sets of legal procedures, depending on how it was approved. While the difference may appear procedural at first glance, it has significant implications for when the transfer transaction is legally completed, and for what the parties can (or cannot) do if the transaction ultimately falls through. This post discusses the two procedures and the practical implications arising from the distinction between them.
Vietnam has temporarily raised several general economic concentration notification thresholds under Resolution No. 66.18 of the Government dated 18 May 2026 (Resolution 66/2026), a practical change for M&A transactions as fewer deals should be caught solely by Vietnamese assets, Vietnamese turnover or transaction value.
On 3 September 2025, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) released the Official Letter no. 13629 addressing questions related to difficulties and obstacles arising from legal regulations in the finance and investment sector. This correspondence has several notable issues that are summarized below. While some of the MOF’s guidance offers welcome flexibility and operational reassurance, others fall short of providing clear or comprehensive clarification, leaving important gaps unresolved and inconsistencies with other legislation unaddressed.
Delegation by the General Meeting of Shareholders endorsed in principle (Query no. 29)
Query/Issue raised:
Current regulations regarding delegation/authorisation (both could be translated to/from "uỷ quyền" in Vietnamese) by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) to the Board are unclear and conflicting. […]
A recurring issue in Vietnam corporate governance is whether a former member of the Board of Directors can be appointed as an “independent” Board member in the subsequent term, provided that all other statutory criteria are satisfied. This typically arises where companies want to retain a former board member while still complying with independence requirements under Article 155.2 of the Enterprises Law 2020 as amended in 2025 (Enterprises Law 2020).
Under Article 155.2(dd) of Enterprises Law 2020, an independent Board member must “not hold the position of member of the Board of the company within the last 05 years or longer unless he/she was designated in 02 consecutive terms.”
Vietnamese law currently lacks a formal definition of “latent defect” (khiếm khuyết ẩn) and a clear mechanism for allocating liability once such defects arise. This regulatory vacuum often leads to prolonged disputes between the Employer and the Contractor, particularly when the construction contracts do not include explicit risk allocation.
For the purpose of our discussion below, a “latent defect” is defined as a fault or flaw in construction works/item that is not discoverable through a reasonably thorough inspection at the time of handover.
When companies think about data protection, they usually focus on “visible” data like names, email addresses, or bank details. However, there is a hidden layer called metadata - essentially “data about data” - that often gets ignored.
Under Vietnam’s new personal data protection rules, overlooking metadata is a major risk. If metadata can be used to identify a specific person, it falls under the same strict rules as regular personal data.
What is Metadata? The “Digital Footprint”
Metadata is information that describes the context of a file or a message rather than the content itself. Even if you remove a person’s name from a file, the metadata can still point directly to them.
Vietnam is currently at a pivotal stage of infrastructure modernization. To meet the immense demand for capital, the State has moved to revitalize private sector participation, most notably through the “Build – Transfer” (BT) model.
In a typical BT arrangement, a private investor finances and constructs an infrastructure project, then transfers it to the State upon completion. In return, the State “pays” the investor with land funds, allowing them to develop a “reciprocal project” (dự án đối ứng) to recover their capital and generate profit. While this mechanism is essential to stimulate private sector participation, the recent new legal framework for BT projects may raise significant concern regarding the land access privileges granted to BT investors compared to their counterparts in the general real estate market. In particular,
The recently issued Case Law No. 81/2024/AL (CL 81) introduces a precedent that allows creditors to bypass the standard statute of limitations by re-characterizing an unpaid contractual debt as a property reclamation claim upon the mutual termination of the contract and an agreement on the payable amount. Below are a few of our observations regarding CL 81.
Summary of the Case
The dispute originated from a service contract between Company M (the Service Provider) and Company A (the Client). After the Service Provider performed its services, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the contract. Subsequently, the Client explicitly confirmed in writing the specific amount of the service fee it owed to the Service Provider and the late payment interest but ultimately failed to make the payment. When the Service Provider filed a lawsuit to recover the unpaid amount, the Client requested the court to dismiss the case, arguing that the 3-year statute of limitations for a contractual dispute had already expired.